人口结构在高呼：“让低利率待得更久一些！”（上）

 

写在开头：人口老龄化是未来十年的大主题，而老龄化必然影响资产配置。许多人已经开始担心，一旦老龄化出现，会导致金融资产被大规模抛售，以支持老龄化人口的养老开支需求，这也导致市场利率会走高。然而，这并没有发生。通过Pimco的模型和研究，对储蓄需求影响最大的、收入最高的人群，都在推迟他们的退休年龄。这种趋势将会推动储蓄需求，而储蓄的需求将至少把全球人口悬崖推到十年之后，并成为全球低中性利率每储蓄-投资均衡的后盾。 70岁将会代替65！市场担心所谓的老龄化“金融风暴”离我们还很遥远，而低利率依然会维持很长一段时间。
——点拾 朱昂

Some financial market observers bieve that, globally, we’ve just gone over an aging-related demographic cliff – and that interest rates may rise as a result. We challenge this traditional thinking about the timing of the so-called demographic cliff and argue that a demographics-induced structural rise in U.S. interest rates remains at least a decade away.

一些金融市场的观察人士认为，从全球范围来看，我们才刚刚跃过人口老龄化的悬崖，利率的上浮也是因为这个趋势。然而，我们对传统认为的人口悬崖来临的时机保有异议，并认为在美国，与人口相关的利率结构性上浮的浪头还远在至少十年之外。

The demand for saving will remain robust. The people who drive the lion’s share of aggregate saving, the highest income earners, are working and saving later in life. This trend should continue fueling the savings glut – and should support a low global neutral interest rate (the “anchor” for U.S. fixed income yields).

对储蓄的需求将持续保持刚劲。能够在储蓄界衣朱带紫的往往是收入最高的人群，今后他们也将继续工作、储蓄，往复不停。这一趋势会继续助燃推动着储蓄过剩的情势——而且可能会拉低全球中性利率（美国固定收益率的锚定参照指标）。

In financial markets, strong demographic demand for bonds should – all else equal – help maintain low U.S. yields in the coming decade. Combine a low global neutral interest rate and strong domestic (demographic) demand for bonds, and what do you get? Lower rates for longer in the U.S.

在金融市场中，其他条件不变的情况下，人口结构的变化导致了对债券的强劲需求，这将使未来十年内美国的收益率徘徊在较低水平。低全球中性利率加上国内市场债券的高需求，等于什么？——美国市场长期的低利率。

Is global aging about to end the savings glut? Some observers think so. More and more baby boomers are reaching retirement age, and they will soon not only save less but also start to dump their accumulated assets to fund retirement … or so the story goes. If this were true, the consequences for interest rates would be profound. The real long-term equilibrium interest rate, which has been on a secular downtrend for decades partly due to strong working-age cohorts saving hard for retirement, would start to rise – and what we here at PIMCO call The New Neutral might soon be history.

全球老龄化问题有能力给储蓄过剩的局面画上句号吗？一部分专家对此持肯定意见。越来越多的二战后“婴儿潮”一代开始迈进退休年龄，很快他们的存款会越来越少，甚至会慢慢掏空自己的养老金，以期安度晚年。如果情况属实，那么该趋势将带来深远的后果。长期均衡实际利率之所以几十年来一直维持着持续下行的趋势，很大程度上是由于大量的适龄劳动力为了退休养老积极地投入储蓄；一旦“婴儿潮”一代纷纷退休，利率的上涨想必避无可避——用PIMCO的话来说，中性利率将很快沉入历史。

We strongly disagree with that thesis of an imminent demographics-induced savings drought. Rather, we have argued in recent work that the global excess supply of saving over investment, which has been largely responsible for the secular decline in equilibrium interest rates, is not only here to stay but likely to increase further in the coming years for a host of reasons including demographics (see PIMCO Macro Perspectives,“No End to the Savings Glut,” September 2015). As a consequence, we continue to expect the fundamental forces of elevated desired saving to keep the equilibrium real rate depressed and to limit the extent to which other (cyclical) factors can drive up market interest rates.

我们强烈反对某篇论文提及的“人口结构变化马上会引发储蓄枯竭”的观点。相反，我们最近的研究提及，全球储蓄的供给远大于储蓄大于投资，是均衡利率持续下行的主要原因；而且出于种种原因，包括人口问题，供给过剩的局面不但无法刹车勒马，未来还可能愈演愈烈（详见PIMCO宏观报告《没有尽头的储蓄过剩》，2015年9月）。因此，我们依然期望较高的理想储蓄水平能够将均衡实际利率控制在较低水平，并限制其他（周期性的）可能推高市场利率的因素所发挥的作用。

However, given the popularity of the thesis that demographics will soon end the savings glut, we undertook a deep dive into the data to investigate the link among demographics, saving behavior and the demand for fixed income assets – with some surprising results. Here’s what we found.

然而，鉴于上述有关人口变化会终结储蓄过剩的论文广被认同，我们对数据进行了深度分析，调查了人口与储蓄行为和固定收益资产需求之间的联系——并发现了许多惊奇的干货。以下便是我们的成果。People of the world, we’re getting old. It’s a well-known fact that, after decades of decline, the global dependency ratio – traditionally defined as the ratio of individuals younger than 15 and older than 64 to the working-age population aged 15-64 – is now rising (see Figure 1).

Some financial market observers argue that this demographic trend reversal will begin to drive interest rates higher, and soon. Why? First, a declining share of high-saving workers and a rising share of dissaving elderly will (the argument goes) erode the demand for saving – and drive interest rates higher via the savings-investment equilibrium. Second, these observers argue, a rapidly growing share of retirees will have to consume (i.e., sell down) their financial asset holdings to fund spending in retirement, and these drawdowns will create selling pressure in financial markets that pushes asset prices down and interest rates up.

人生在世，韶华易逝。众所周知，全球人口赡养比率（一般定义为0-14岁及65岁以上受赡养人口相对15-64岁的劳动人口）在持续下滑了几十年后，现在开始上升（详见图1）。

一部分金融市场观测者认为，这项人口结构的逆转趋势将飞速地推高利率。何出此言？第一，高储蓄劳动人口的减少和负储蓄老年人口的增多将破坏对储蓄的需求，储蓄减少，利率也会因储蓄投资的再平衡而上涨。第二，这些观测者们认为，随着退休人口比率的增大，退休人员将抛售自己持有的金融资产来养老，这将引起金融资产的抛售压力，造成资产价格的下跌和利率的上涨。



Our core thesis in a nutshell: Yes, global aging may someday drive U.S. interest rates structurally higher. But “someday” remains at least a decade away – for two reasons. First, we proffer that global saving will remain stronger than many expect, supporting a low global neutral interest rate. (As investors, we care about the neutral rate because it anchors fixed income yields in the market.) Second, U.S. demographic demand for fixed income assets should remain robust until at least 2025 – and in the meantime should continue to put downward pressure on market yields, all else equal. Combine a low global “anchor” and strong domestic fixed income demand, and what do you get? Lower rates for longer in the U.S.

我们的核心论点是：没错，全球老龄化也许某天会导致美国利率的结构性上涨，但这个“某天”至少离我们还有十年开外。——原因有二，首先，我们认为全球储蓄比很多人预期的更顽强坚韧，尚有能力维持住全球低中性利率。（作为投资人，我们认为中性利率非同小可，因为它能够锚定市场固定收益回报率。）其次，至少到2025年，美国市场上对固定收益资产的人口需求都仍将保持刚劲——与此同时应继续向市场收益率施加向下压力，其他一切照旧。较低的锚定参照点加较高的国内固收需求等于什么？——美国市场长期的低利率。Remember the link between saving and interest rates: In the savings-investment equilibrium, rising demand for saving pushes down the equilibrium (or neutral, or natural) rate of interest, all else equal, and vice-versa. Our task, then, is to assess how demographic changes affect aggregate saving. We find that the traditional “dependency ratio,” used in many other studies on this topic, is flawed. We suggest two modifications to address those flaws. First, the young, considered “dependents,” contribute very little to global saving and dissaving in dollar terms (they’re “non-savers”). We therefore prefer to focus on the ratio of “Peak Savers” (mature adult workers who earn and save a lot) to “Elderly” (who save less as they age and ultimately consume their savings in retirement). Let’s preliminarily define “Peak Savers” as individuals aged 35 to 64, for two reasons:

请牢牢记住储蓄和利率之间的关系：在储蓄投资恒等式中，一旦储蓄的需求增加，均衡利率（无论是中性利率还是自然利率）就会被压缩，反之亦然。而我们的任务便是评估人口结构的变化是如何影响总储蓄的。我们发现，在许多类似的专题研究中常提及的人口赡养率不够严谨缜密。我们有两个修正人口赡养率缺陷的方案。第一，被称为“受抚养人”的少年及婴幼儿对全球储蓄的影响基本可以忽略不计，并且他们属于负储蓄人群（他们没有积蓄）。因此我们提倡更关注“储蓄峰值”人群（收入和积蓄可观的成年劳动力）与“老年人”（随年龄增长而减少储蓄，并在退休后花销存款的人群）的比率。“储蓄峰值”人群的年龄区间可初步划在35至64周岁之间，原因如下：

People 35–64 have generally exhibited much higher savings rates than people in younger and older age groups;People 35–64 earn considerably more income than people younger and older – so for any given savings rate, this age group’s saving behavior will have an outsized effect on saving and investment flows in dollar terms.

35-64周岁的人一般有着比年轻人和老人更高的储蓄率；35-64周岁的人一般比年轻人和老人的收入更高——因此，给定任一储蓄率，该年龄区间内个体的储蓄行为都会对按美元计的储蓄与投资流产生非凡的影响。

Let’s preliminarily define “Elderly” aseveryone 65 and older (the traditional definition). Thus, the global PeakSavers versus Elderly ratio in Figure 2 reflects a static 35–64Peak Saver cohort – and reveals what appears to be ademographic cliff in about year 2010. Those who argue that demographic supportfor saving will fall sharply in the coming years typically will try to provetheir point using a ratio like this one.

我们将“老人”大致定义为65周岁及以上的个体。因此，全球储蓄峰值人群对老年人比率，如图2所示，表现了35-64岁的储蓄峰值人群占比的变化走势，并侧面反映出2010年类似人口悬崖的情况。赞同储蓄率会骤降的人群可以该比率为参考，判断人口结构变化对储蓄产生的影响。



But we ask: Is it sensible to define the Peak Saver and Elderly groups by the same static age ranges over long periods of time? Put differently: Might working and saving behavior evolve over time, warranting a dynamically modified dependency ratio? Seniors’ ability to work (and save) later in life should continue to rise; in our increasingly services-based “knowledge economy,” jobs are becoming less physically demanding and often require more experience, while advances in health technology boost functional age in life’s later stages. Seniors’ willingness (and incentives) to work longer also should rise along with their ability.

然而问题总是接踵而至：随着时间的推移，储蓄峰值人群对老年人比率定义的年龄区间能一成不变吗？或者说：既然工作与储蓄行为会随着时代发展不断变化、演进，人口赡养率是否也会随之成为不断浮动？成人的工作和储蓄能力将不断提升；而且，在这个越来越向服务密集型社会靠近的“知识型经济”社会中，体力劳动逐渐被脑力劳动取代，工作经验成了衡量劳动力能力的重要标准。而在医疗技术进步显著的今天，人类的可工作年限一直在不断延长，持续工作的意愿和动力都随之上涨。

True, the retirement age, globally, has not kept pace with rising longevity. But policymakers are slowly catching on. In the U.S., the Social Security full-benefit retirement age is increasing to 67 and will go higher still – a government incentive telling people to stay in the workforce. Meanwhile, years of low interest rates have left impending retirees playing catch-up in retirement saving. More generally, around the world, longer lives must ultimately be supported by longer working lives. Anything less will prove unsustainable. Our colleague Jim Moore summed up the state of affairs (in the U.S.) in a PIMCO Viewpoint from 2012: “Work a little longer. Save a little more. Get by with a little less.

放眼全球，退休年龄确实远远赶不上节节攀升的长寿率，但各国政策总有些缓步踯躅的意思。在美国，退休年龄已被拔到了67周岁甚至可能更高——很明显政府希望延长劳动力工龄。况且，长年低利率的形势让即将退休的群体不得不想办法拼力存钱来安度晚年。况且总揽全局，人类的长寿必须伴随更老的退休年龄，如若不然，退休生活想必也是好景不久。PIMCO的同事吉姆•摩尔在2012年发表的一篇评价中总结了美国国情，说道：“人们该工作得久一点，储蓄得狠一点，生活开支少一点。”

We think this insight applies abroad as well. In fact, global trends already underway support our argument that people will work later and later in life. In many economically important geographies – notably the U.S., eurozone, UK and Japan – senior (age 65+) labor force participation has been trending higher. And China is contemplating steadily raising its retirement age in the coming years.

窃以为吉姆的建议在其他国家也适用。其实全球国情趋势都暗示了人们将会工作得更久，工龄会不断延长。在很多重要经济体——特别是美国、欧元区、英国和日本——老年人（65周岁以上人群）的持续工作率一直有走高的趋势。而中国也在计划着在未来几年内上调法定退休年龄。

However, what matters most for global saving demand are those who earn the most income. Consider the U.S. as an example. Top-income-quintile households control nearly two-thirds of U.S. household income, three-quarters of household wealth and more than 80% of household financial assets. Apart from the major social ramifications of wide (and widening) income and wealth inequality, the implications for aggregate saving are critical: Rather obviously, high earners’ working and saving behavior has an outsized effect on global saving in dollar terms. If the highest earners are working (and saving) later in life, we should pay attention. Witness the dramatic rise in labor force participation within the top income quintile (Figure 3): Over 60% of top-quintile individuals in the 65–74 age group are employed or seeking work, a 19-percentage-point increase in participation over the 15 years through 2013.2 Moreover, participation among top-income-quintile seniors 75 and older has more than doubled over the same period.

不过对全球储蓄需求影响最大的还是处于收入金字塔顶端的人群。以美国为例分析：总人口中收入最高那五分之一的家庭持有占全美三分之二的家庭收入、四分之三的家庭财产和80%以上的家庭金融资产。美国显著且仍在日益拉大的收入与财富分配不均对社会有着深远的影响，但即便抛开这点不谈，总储蓄依然至关重要：很显然，高收入人群的收入和储蓄情况对以美元计算的全球总储蓄影响非凡。如果这些位于收入塔尖的人们延长了工龄，那么有关储蓄的数据会产生重大的变动。详参收入前五分之一人群劳动参与率的骤升（图3）：在收入前1/5人群中，超过60%的处于65-74周岁年龄段的人仍在工作或找工作，截至2013年，15年来该年龄段的劳动参与率上升了19%。不止如此，同时段内收入前1/5人群中75周岁以上的劳动参与率甚至翻了一番有余。

What about seniors’ late-life having behavior? Consider the top two income quintiles, collectively accounting for about 80% of U.S. personal income. Based on 2014 data from the BLS’s Consumer Expenditure Survey, these high earners exhibit no decline in savings rates as they enter retirement (due in part to a strong bequest motive and high conservatism). In Figure 4, note how high and consistent these top earners’ savings rates remain even in their late 60s and 70s.

那么晚年储蓄行为又有何特点呢？美国收入前2/5的人群占据了全美80%的个人收入总和。根据2014年BLS消费者支出调研数据显示，这些高收入人群即便在退休后，储蓄率也没有减少（可能出于强烈的积蓄遗产的动因及保守思想）。如图4所示，请关注高收入人群即使在60-80岁的高龄阶段，储蓄率也依然居高不下。



(Aside: We find it curious that savings rates, based on the BLS’s Consumer Expenditure Survey, do not become negative for lower-income-quintile seniors even in their late 70s. We suspect that other data sources may show a negative savings rate for these elderly groups, likely due to methodological differences in data collection. Our focus here, however, is on age-related trends in saving behavior rather than savings rates themselves.)

（另外：令人疑惑的是，根据BLS消费者支出调研数据显示，收入后1/5的老年人在七十岁后储蓄率也没有跌至负数。不过由于存在统计方法不同的可能，也许其他数据来源可能显示该群体储蓄率为负。关键在于无论如何，我们对数据的研究集中在各年龄段的储蓄率，而不必过度关注储蓄率数值本身。）

What a different picture the dynamic ratio paints! It suggests that demographic support for saving could well be as strong a decade from now as it has been in recent decades – and illustrates the extent to which traditional static ratios may be flawed.

将年龄区间进行调整后，动态比率发生了极大的变化！经过这番脱胎换骨的调整，十年后的比率也能够像十年前一样清晰有效——而从该图也可看出，若不考虑工龄的动态变化，传统的单一数据比率可能存在的误差。

We concede that our dynamic ratio forecast is only a guess as to what the future may look like if current trends persist. But there is some method to the madness. For example, the reason we start to phase the 65- to 69-year-olds into our Peak Saver group specifically in 2000 is that senior labor force participation began to rise rapidly in that year (after two stagnant decades). Our five-years-later-in-life-by-2050 employment assumption is slightly more arbitrary, but reasonable given that, globally, the largest increases in retirement age likely lie ahead of us. And our dynamic ratio does not account for the rising share of seniors 70+ who remain working, introducing an element of conservatism to our assumptions. So while our dynamic ratio embeds some simplifying assumptions, to be more scientific risks missing the forest for the trees. Almost regardless of the assumptions used, if you define a dependency ratio dynamically – based even loosely on observable trends – you are likely to paint a very different (and more accurate) picture of the future than you will paint using a static ratio.

不得不承认，我们提出的动态比率概念只是基于其他条件均不改变情况下，对未来情势的一种预测方式而已。比如，我们把65-69岁的人口也划进储蓄峰值人群，是由于沉寂了20年的老龄人口的劳动参与率在2000年开始疾升。我们提出的2050年工龄会延长5年的假设可能稍显武断，但从全球范围看还是合理的，因为各国政策不同，最大的退休年龄调高可能超过我们的预估。而保守起见，我们的动态比率还不包括70岁后仍继续工作的人——为了总揽全局我们的预测模型是经过简化的，毕竟一味追求模型的科学与完整可能导致见树不见林的后果。但就算抛开预设条件不谈，和静态数据比率相比，动态人口赡养率（即便只是大致建立在可观测到的趋势上）所画出的预测曲线也会相当不同。